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ABSTRACT This study concerns balance in exchange relationships as described in the
psychological contract literature about employees’ and employers’ promises and
fulfilment of these promises. Balance is investigated, firstly, in relation to temporary
versus permanent employment and, secondly, in relation to employees’ attitudes
(fairness, job satisfaction, and intention to quit). Analyses were based on a Dutch sample
of 290 temporary and 489 permanent workers. Regarding balance in mutual promises,
we found that temporary workers were more likely to have psychological contracts with
few mutual promises than permanent workers, while permanent workers were more
likely to have psychological contracts with many mutual promises compared to
temporary workers. Regarding balance in the fulfilment of promises, we found the
opposite pattern, namely, that fulfilment was higher in temporary workers compared
to permanent workers. Furthermore, only mutual high fulfilment of promises was
associated with higher job satisfaction and fairness and with lower intentions to quit.
KEYWORDS employment relationship, psychological contracts, reciprocity, social
exchange, temporary employment
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the use of temporary employment has increased in most
Western countries, including the USA (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000), the
European Union (De Cuyper, Isaksson, & De Witte, 2005), and China (Yang &
Zhou, 1999). This development has stimulated a vast number of studies concerning
the consequences of temporary employment arrangements for the workers
involved. Temporary employment refers to dependent employment of limited
duration, as in the case of fixed-term contracts or temporary agency contracts
(OECD, 2002). The short duration of temporary employment arrangements has
an effect on some of the elements of the traditional open-ended employment
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relationship (Ashford, George, & Blatt, 2007; De Cuyper, De Jong, De Witte,
Isaksson, Rigotti, & Schalk, 2008a), such as feelings of job insecurity. Little is
known, however, about the implications of temporary employment for one of
the basic assumptions underlying employment relationships, namely, the norm of
reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity defines a social norm through which efforts by
one party are reciprocated by a second party to create balance (Wu et al., 2006).
Gouldner (1960) suggests that the norm of reciprocity is the basic principle under-
lying exchanges at work. Theories on exchanges in the employee–organization
relationship, such as social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and psychological con-
tract theory (Rousseau, 1995), for example, emphasize the importance of the norm
of reciprocity in predicting employees’ attitudes and behaviours.
In this study, we investigate the norm of reciprocity in the context of both
temporary and permanent employment, adopting a psychological contract frame-
work. The psychological contract entails perceptions of mutual promises (i.e.,
employers’ promises in exchange for employees’ promises or promise-based exchange)
and the perceived fulfilment of these promises (i.e., employers’ fulfilment of prom-
ises in exchange for employees’ fulfilment of promises or fulfilment-based exchange). In
particular, we explore temporary versus permanent workers’ perceptions concern-
ing both promise-based and fulfilment-based exchange as well as the relationship
between these perceptions of exchange and employees’ attitudes (in terms of
fairness, job satisfaction, and intention to quit). This study contributes to the
literature in three ways. First, we address the paucity in research on the exchange
underlying the employment relations of temporary workers as compared to
permanent workers. Second, we assess whether different types of exchange
relate differently to employee attitudes. Third, we investigate both the exchange of
promises and the exchange of fulfilment of promises.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
The Psychological Contract: Four Types of Exchanges
Reciprocity is a critical issue in psychological contract research (Rousseau &
Tijoriwala, 1998; Tekleab & Taylor, 2003). The psychological contract literature
distinguishes between balanced and unbalanced psychological contracts. Under a
balanced psychological contract, the ‘employee and the employer are perceived to
be similarly obligated in the exchange’ (Shore & Barksdale, 1998: 732); both parties
may perceive having either few or many obligations. A quasi-spot psychological
contract involves few obligations, and a mutual high obligation psychological
contract involves many obligations by both parties. Conversely, under an unbal-
anced exchange, ‘either the employee or the employer is substantially more obli-
gated than the other actor in the exchange’ (Shore & Barksdale, 1998: 732), which
portrays a situation of employer under- or over-obligation. In addition to Shore
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and Barksdale (1998), the distinction between quasi-spot, mutual high obligation,
employer under-obligation, and employer over-obligation was also proposed
earlier by Tsui, Pearce, Porter, and Tripoli (1997) and will be used in this study.
However, there are some shortcomings in current conceptualizations of
exchanges in the psychological contract. First, most studies focus on employers’
psychological contract promises as perceived by the employee (Conway & Briner,
2005; Lambert, Edwards, & Cable, 2003; Porter, Pearce, Tripoli, & Lewis, 1998;
Turnley & Feldman, 1999). Few studies have added employees’ psychological
contract promises, which is a critical condition if the aim is to investigate exchange
in psychological contracting.
Second, most studies, such as the study by Tsui et al. (1997) as well as others
(Sels, Janssens, & Van den Brande, 2004; Shore & Barksdale, 1998), have focused
on the exchange of promises rather than the exchange of fulfilled promises. Many
studies, however, have highlighted the critical importance of fulfilment. For
example, psychological contract research suggests that outcomes may be more
strongly related to the fulfilment of psychological contract promises than to prom-
ises per se (Lambert et al., 2003). In particular, the exchange of fulfilled employee
and employer promises from the perspective of the employee has mostly been
ignored in empirical studies (Lambert, 2007), although some theoretical frame-
works do exist, such as equity theory (Adams, 1965), inducement-contribution
theory (March & Simon, 1958), and the effort-reward imbalance model (Siegrist,
1996). Furthermore, the relative effect of the exchange of fulfilled promises com-
pared to the exchange of promises has received little attention.
Finally, most studies have focused upon associations between the psychological
contract and outcomes. Less known are the antecedents of psychological contract-
ing, especially a comparison of types of workers with respect to their exchange
within the psychological contract. As Shore et al. (2004) note, the exchange in
‘non-traditional’ work relationships is missing in both empirical and theoretical
research. The implication is that exchange should be investigated in these types of
work relationships as well.
To address these shortcomings, we use employees’ perceptions of both employer
and employee promises within the psychological contract to define two categories
of psychological contract exchanges. Promise-based exchange focuses on reciprocal
employees’ and employers’ promises. Fulfilment-based exchange is based on the recip-
rocal fulfilment of these promises. For each exchange, we define the four types of
exchanges mentioned above (in line with Shore & Barksdale, 1998; Tsui et al.,
1997): (i) the mutual high obligation psychological contract concerns many promises or
high fulfilment of promises on the part of both employees and employers; (ii) the
quasi-spot psychological contract concerns few promises or low fulfilment of promises on
the part of both employees and employers; (iii) the employer over-obligation psychological
contract concerns few promises or limited fulfilment on the part of the employee and
many promises or high fulfilment on the part of the employer; and (iv) the employer
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under-obligation psychological contract concerns many promises or high fulfilment on
the part of the employee and limited obligation or fulfilment on the part of the
employer. These four types exist for both promise-based exchange and fulfilment-
based exchange. We investigate these types in relation to temporary versus per-
manent employment and also in relation to employees’ attitudes.
Perceptions of the Psychological Contract by Temporary and
Permanent Workers
Promise-based exchange. Rousseau (1995) argues that temporary workers have a
more transactional psychological contract, while permanent workers hold a more
relational psychological contract. The critical distinction between transactional
and relational psychological contracts is that the first focuses on economic
exchange of promises and the second on both economic and socio-emotional
exchange of promises. This implies that transactional psychological contracts are
narrower than relational psychological contracts, i.e., comprising less psychologi-
cal contract promises on the part of the employer or the employee (McLean-
Parks, Kidder, & Gallagher, 1998). In other words, the psychological contracts of
temporary workers include fewer promises than those of permanent workers.
This assumption has received considerable support where employers’ promises
are concerned (Chambel & Castanheira, 2006; Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002a;
Van Dyne & Ang, 1998). The economic motives for hiring temporary workers
(e.g., reducing labour costs, coping with peaks in production), which translate to
more economic or transactional psychological contracts, may be at the root of
these findings.
However, little is known about promises made by temporary workers compared
with permanent workers. The differences with respect to employee obligations may
also be grounded in future employment prospects. On the one hand, temporary
workers are likely to invest considerably in the employment relationship with a
view toward increasing their chance to transition to permanent employment or in
anticipation of a balanced exchange. Given few employer promises, this would
indicate a situation of employer under-obligation towards temporary workers. On
the other hand, temporary workers are likely to invest less in cases where they do
not expect future employment and when the organization does not invest by
providing opportunities for further development. This portrays a quasi-spot psy-
chological contract. In contrast, permanent workers may be more likely to have a
psychological contract based on mutual high obligation, that is, a psychological
contract that reciprocates the organization’s intentions to invest in the employee.
But the exchange of promises between permanent workers and the organization is
not necessarily reciprocal. Permanent workers are frequently regarded as crucial
for the functioning of the organization owing to their experience. Therefore,
organizations might invest more than necessary to avoid the turnover of perma-
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nent workers. Alternately, permanent workers might feel overly secure, which
could lead them to make fewer contributions compared to employer investments.
These arguments suggest a psychological contract based on employer over-
obligation and are largely in line with the findings of De Cuyper, Rigotti, De Witte,
and Mohr (2008b), who established that temporary workers compared with per-
manent workers were more likely to have psychological contracts with fewer
promises made by the employer, such as the quasi-spot psychological contract
or the employer under-obligation psychological contract. Accordingly, our first
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Temporary workers will be more likely to perceive the promised psychological
contract as quasi-spot or employer under-obligation, compared to permanent workers.
Hypothesis 1b: Permanent workers will be more likely to perceive the promised psychological
contract as mutual high obligation or employer over-obligation, compared to temporary
workers.
Fulfilment-based exchange. An interesting issue, which has been largely ignored in
previous studies, concerns the relationship between temporary employment and
types of psychological contract fulfilment. Some arguments suggest that permanent
workers are more likely to perceive breach by the organization than temporary
workers. This may be because, first, the psychological contracts of permanent
workers likely include more employer promises that – due to relational content –
are more open to interpretation (Guest & Clinton, 2005). Such psychological
contracts with low tangibility are more susceptible to breach (McLean-Parks et al.,
1998). Second, temporary employment may provide insufficient realization of
exchange owing to the short duration of the relation (Connelly & Gallagher, 2004).
Unlike permanent workers, temporary workers may not consider employers’
failure to fulfil the psychological contract as a breach because they anticipate that
the psychological contract will be discontinued in the future. This suggests that
perceived fulfilment of employers’ promises is more positive for temporary workers
than for permanent workers.
Permanent workers may react to breach by reducing their commitment to
promises as well (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002b), which then implies a quasi-spot
contract. Alternatively, they may be reluctant to report failure to commit to their
promises; in this regard, Morrison and Robinson (1997) have suggested that
employees are more likely to perceive lower fulfilment by the organization than by
the employee, due to a self-serving bias. This would imply that permanent workers
develop a psychological contract characterized by under-obligation. Fulfilment of
the psychological contract in temporary workers may align with our description of
mutual high obligation psychological contracts: temporary workers may recipro-
cate the organization’s fulfilment of the contract. Psychological contracts based on
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employer over-obligation may be rare, given employees’ tendency to overestimate
their contribution to the deal. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Temporary workers will be more likely to perceive the fulfilled psychological
contract as mutual high obligation.
Hypothesis 2b: Permanent workers will be more likely to perceive the fulfilled psychological
contract as quasi-spot or employer under-obligation.
The Psychological Contract: Associations with Employee Attitudes
Promise-based exchange. Most researchers agree that psychological contracts based
on mutual high obligations are most desirable (Koh & Yer, 2000) and that they
relate to favourable employees’ attitudes (De Cuyper et al., 2008b). This assump-
tion has also found support in studies by Shore and Barksdale (1998), Hom et al.
(2009), and Tsui et al. (1997) with respect to affective organizational commit-
ment, organizational support, trust, and fairness. Mutual high obligation psycho-
logical contracts are thought to promote a relationship based on trust, as both
parties show a willingness to invest in the relationship in the future. Based on
these expectations of investment, employees are committed and intend to stay
with the organization. The three other psychological contract types in some way
or another signal a lack of trust. The quasi-spot contract entails promises rep-
resenting only few inducements that the other party may expect in the future.
The employer over-obligation and employer under-obligation contracts signal a
potential imbalance in the promised inducements the other party may receive in
the future. Hence, these contracts are assumed to be associated with unfavour-
able outcomes in comparison to the mutual high obligation psychological con-
tract, as employees are less inclined to commit to and remain in an unfavourable
exchange.
Yet, there is considerable debate about which psychological contract type is
most undesirable. Following the effort–reward imbalance model, one would expect
failed reciprocity of employer under-obligation to relate to unfavourable outcomes.
However, this was not supported in the study by Tsui et al. (1997), who found
non-significant associations between psychological contracts based on employer
under-obligation and employees’ attitudes. Shore and Barksdale (1998) as well as
De Cuyper et al. (2008b) established that employer over-obligation was related to
poor attitudes; however, this was not replicated in the studies by Tsui et al. (1997)
and Koh and Yer (2000), who instead found the quasi-spot contract to be pro-
blematic. We offer as a general conclusion that, following the norm of reciprocity,
mutual high obligation psychological contracts compared with other types of
psychological contracts are positively related to employees’ attitudes.
334 J. de Jong et al.
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Hypothesis 3: A promised mutual high obligation psychological contract will relate more
strongly to employees’ fairness perception, job satisfaction, and intention to quit, compared to
quasi-spot, employer over-obligation, and employer under-obligation.
Fulfilment-based exchange. One explanation for the varied findings in earlier studies
could be that these studies focused on promises by both parties rather than on
fulfilment. Studies show fulfilment of a deal to relate more strongly and more
consistently to employees’ attitudes than promises constituting the deal (Conway &
Briner, 2005; Lambert et al., 2003). Following social exchange theory, relation-
ships depend on the reciprocation of valuable efforts and recourses (Blau, 1964).
When promised efforts and recourses are fulfilled, the other party is likely to
reciprocate by the fulfilment of promises, creating a fair relationship that both
parties would like to maintain. When one or both parties fail to fulfil their promises,
this results in lower intention to maintain this relationship.
Hypothesis 4: A fulfilled mutual high obligation psychological contract will relate more strongly
to employees’ fairness perception, job satisfaction, and intention to quit, compared to quasi-spot,
employer over-obligation, and employer under-obligation.
METHOD
Sample and Procedures
Data were collected in the Netherlands. Temporary employment accounted for
about 17 percent of the total national workforce in 2004 – a relatively large share
in comparison to other European countries (De Cuyper et al., 2005). Most tem-
porary workers in the Netherlands are employed on fixed-term or temporary
agency contracts (De Jong & Schalk, 2005). The Dutch labour market has a fairly
high level of regulation: collective labour agreements and labour laws provide a
floor of minimum protection for all workers, temporary as well as permanent (De
Jong, Schalk, & Goessling, 2007).
For this study, respondents were recruited in four sectors: retail (n = 255), manu-
facturing (n = 222), healthcare (n = 40), and education (n = 262). Our choice for
these sectors was based on the following arguments. First, the sectors had a
relatively large temporary workforce in 2004 and, thus, coincide with our specific
research focus. Second, these sectors were likely to maximize variance in the types
of temporary workers. In total, 48 organizations participated: 17 retail organiza-
tions, 16 manufacturing organizations, 13 educational organizations, and two
healthcare organizations. For the retail sector, we contacted organizations such as
shops and insurance companies. Organizations in the manufacturing sector were
primarily foodstuff producers, but the sample also included bicycle manufacturers
and producers of heavy machinery. The educational sample included high schools,
professional education institutes, and universities. The healthcare sample consisted
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of one hospital and one healthcare centre providing home care and care for the
elderly.
We invited the human resource managers or, in the case of smaller retail
organizations, the shop managers of the organizations to participate. Upon agree-
ment to participate, we asked the human resource department to select a random
sample of both permanent and temporary workers (including fixed-term contract,
temporary agency, and seasonal workers), for example, by selecting employee
administration numbers. After completing this selection process, the managers
distributed the surveys. We sought to obtain equal numbers of temporary and
permanent workers. However, this was not always possible owing to the low
number of temporary workers in some organizations. In such cases, all temporary
workers were sampled. The employees were given a questionnaire to fill out at
home and were asked to return the questionnaire directly to the researchers by
regular mail. Responses per organization varied between two and 60. Response
rates also varied between organizations, ranging from 10 percent to as high as 87
percent. The average response rate was 35.5 percent, which is acceptable given
that earlier studies in the realm of temporary employment achieved a similar
response (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2002a).
The total sample included 380 female employees and 399 male employees. In
total, 290 temporary workers and 489 permanent workers returned the question-
naire. The sample of temporary workers included several arrangement types, such
as fixed-term contract workers (63 percent), temporary agency workers (26
percent), and trainees (6 percent). The average duration of the temporary jobs was
about one year (11.97 months), and the average time left on these arrangements
was about six months (6.13 months). The average age of the sample was 37 years.
About 58 percent (n = 448) of the respondents completed a high school education.
The average organizational tenure was six years and 11 months.
The groups of temporary and permanent workers in our sample differed
with respect to age. Temporary workers (M = 32.12) were significantly younger
than permanent workers (M = 39.63), t = –9.35, p < 0.001. We found no differ-
ences with respect to gender, c2 (1, 777) = 0.14, p = n.s., or educational level,
c2 (7, 777) = 6.44, p = n.s.
Measures
Psychological contract promises and fulfilment. The psychological contract items were
developed in the context of the PSYCONES project (Psychological contracting
across employment situations: http://www.uv.es/psycon) – an EU-funded
research project in which the authors participated. The measure was based on
factor analyses of earlier instruments (Isaksson et al., 2003). To construct the four
types of employee–organization relationships needed to test our research hypoth-
eses, we used four scales.
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Employers’ promises. Respondents had to rate whether or not (no = 0, yes = 1) the
organization committed to a series of 15 promises. These promises included such
aspects as job content (e.g., ‘provide you with interesting work’), economic incen-
tives (e.g., ‘provide you with good pay for the work you do’), and the physical
and social circumstances (e.g., ‘provide you with a safe working environment’;
‘provide you with a good work atmosphere’). One item, namely, ‘ensure fair
treatment by managers and supervisors’, was excluded owing to potential overlap
with fairness as an outcome variable. We added all ‘yes’ responses to form
one scale that ranged from 0 to 14. Reliability was satisfactory (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.89).
Employers’ fulfilment of promises. When answering ‘yes’ to a specific item on the
employers’ promises scale, a question concerning fulfilment followed. In particular,
the respondents had to rate the extent to which the organization fulfilled its
promises (1 = promises not kept at all to 5 = promise fully kept). Reliability was
0.91. To calculate the employers’ fulfilment score, we used the average score of
the items.
Employees’ promises. Similarly, for each of 17 possible items, respondents had to rate
whether or not (no = 0, yes = 1) they themselves had made the specific promise.
These promises concerned loyalty on the part of the employee (e.g., ‘protect your
company’s image’), respect for the company’s rules, regulations, and policies (e.g.,
‘turn up for work on time’), and organizational citizenship behaviours (e.g., ‘vol-
unteer to do tasks outside your job description’). All ‘yes’ responses were added.
This yielded a scale ranging from 0 to 17, with a reliability of 0.92.
Employees’ fulfilment of promises. When answering ‘yes’ to a specific content item on
the employees’ promises scale, respondents had to rate the extent to which they
had actually fulfilled this promise (1 = promise not kept at all to 5 = promise fully
kept). Reliability was 0.88. To calculate the employees’ fulfilment score, we used
the average score of the items.
These four scales served to create four types of psychological contracts for
promise-based exchange and fulfilment-based exchange. Following Tsui et al.
(1997) and Koh and Yer (2000), we performed a median-split on the four scales,
resulting in few versus many employers’ and employees’ promises and in low versus
high employers’ and employees’ fulfilment. Regarding promise-based exchange,
the combination of few employees’ and few employers’ promises reflected a quasi-
spot psychological contract promise (n = 407). Many employees’ and many
employers’ promises signalled a high mutual obligation psychological contract
promise (n = 97). Employer over-obligation promise resulted from the combination
of many employers’ promises and few employees’ promises (n = 13), while
employer under-obligation promise resulted from combining few employers’
promises and many employees’ promises (n = 262). Similarly, with respect to
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fulfilment-based exchange, we defined quasi-spot psychological contract fulfilment
as low fulfilment on the part of both employees and employers (n = 327). Mutual
high obligation psychological contract fulfilment reflected high fulfilment on the
part of both employees and employers (n = 153). Employer over-obligation fulfil-
ment represented low fulfilment on the part of the employee and high fulfilment on
the part of the employer (n = 33). Finally, employer under-obligation fulfilment
signalled high fulfilment on the part of the employee but low fulfilment on the part
of the employer (n = 200).
Fairness. We used a general measure of fairness developed by Guest and Conway
(1998). This measure includes four items covering distributive, procedural, and
interactional aspects, which are the three most prominent forms of fairness
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). One of the four items used was
‘Do you feel that you are paid fairly for the work you do?’ The scale consisted
of five response categories, ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘totally’ (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.70).
Job satisfaction. We assessed job satisfaction using a scale based on Brayfield and
Rothe’s (1951) job satisfaction index. Four items were measured on a five-point
scale, ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. An example item
included ‘I find enjoyment in my job’. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87.
Intention to quit. Intention to quit was measured using a four-item scale. The scale
was adapted from Price (1997) and Sjöberg and Sverke (2000) to fit the perspective
of temporary workers. The items included (i) ‘These days, I often feel like quitting’;
(ii) ‘Despite the obligations I have made to this organization, I want to quit my job
as soon as possible’; (iii) ‘At this moment, I would like to stay with this organization
as long as possible’ (reverse scored); and (iv) ‘If I could, I would quit today.’
The five-point response scale ranged from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79).
We conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) to examine whether the
data reflected the factor structure that would be expected considering the seven
variables included (employer promises, employee promises, employer fulfilment,
employee fulfilment, fairness, job satisfaction, and intention to quit). A CFA on
the item level including all variables was not possible, however, because of
missing values for employer and employee fulfilment of promises (it was only
when a promise was made that the degree of fulfilment could be assessed, and
since most employees did not consider that promises were made on all items, this
resulted in a high number of missing values). To assess whether the scales we used
were indeed independent measures, we did CFAs on the scale level. We com-
pared the baseline model of seven factors against alternative models with fewer
factors. Out of the range of models from one to six factors, the models with three
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factors (psychological contract promises, psychological contract fulfilment,
outcome variables) and with five factors (psychological contract promises, psycho-
logical contact fulfilment, fairness, job satisfaction, intention to quit) relatively
had the best fit. Compared to both the three- and five-factor models, the seven-
factor model had a significantly better fit, however. For the model with seven
factors, c2 = 33.06 (df = 1), goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = 0.99, root mean square
residuals (RMR) = 0.03, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.98, Tucker-Lewis index
(TLI) = 0.52, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.21. For
the five-factor model, c2 = 193.55 (df = 10), Dc2 = 160.49 (p < 0.001), GFI = 0.94,
RMR = 0.12, CFI = 0.87, TLI = 0.72, and RMSEA = 0.16. For the three-factor
model, c2 = 184.86 (df = 11), Dc2 = 151.81 (p < 0.001), GFI = 0.94, RMR = 0.09,
CFI = 0.88, TLI = 0.76, and RMSEA = 0.15.
Control variables. Past research has shown a relationship between demographic
variables such as gender, age, and educational level on the one hand and psycho-
logical contract perceptions (De Vos, 2002), fairness perceptions (Cohen-Charash
& Spector, 2001), and other work-related attitudes on the other hand. Therefore,
we controlled for three demographic variables: gender (0 = female; 1 = male), age
(in years), and educational level. Educational level was assessed using International
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels (OECD, 1999), ranging from
0 (pre-primary education) to 6 (second-stage tertiary education). Table 1 shows the
descriptive statistics and correlations of the main variables used in this study.
Analysis
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the relationship between temporary or permanent
employment and promise- and fulfillment-based psychological contract types, we
used multinomial logistic regressions. Multinomial logistic regression can be used for
the analysis of categorical response data with continuous or categorical explanatory
variables. Parameter estimates are obtained through direct maximum likelihood
estimation (Bull & Donner, 1987). We ran two multinomial logistic regressions with
both promise-based and fulfillment-based psychological contracts as dependent
variables. Type of contract was entered as a factor, and our control variables were
entered as covariates. The mutual high obligation psychological contract was used
as the reference category for both promise-based and fulfillment-based exchange.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 concerning the relationship between promise- and
fulfillment-based psychological contracts and employees’ attitudes were tested with
anova, including the control variables (ancova). We also included the interaction
term between type of employment and type of psychological contract to exclude
the possibility that psychological contract types associate differently with the out-
comes in temporary and permanent workers. Additionally, Bonferroni post-hoc
pairwise comparisons were conducted to further investigate significant differences
between psychological contract types.
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RESULTS
Table 2 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regressions performed to test
Hypothesis 1 on promise-based exchange. Hypothesis 1a concerned associations
between temporary employment and quasi-spot and employer under-obligation
promised psychological contracts. The results showed that temporary employment
was positively associated with the quasi-spot (b = -1.23, p < 0.001) and employer
under-obligation (b = -0.73, p < 0.05) promised psychological contracts, as
expected. Thus, Hypothesis 1a was supported. Hypothesis 1b concerned associa-
tions between permanent employment and mutual high obligation or employer
over-obligation promised psychological contracts. Contrary to expectations, we
found that temporary employment rather than permanent employment was asso-
ciated with over-obligation promised psychological contracts, although the asso-
ciation was not significant. The results also imply that permanent employment was
positively associated with mutual high obligation promised psychological contracts,
as expected. An additional multinomial logistic regression with the quasi-spot
relationship as the reference group confirmed these results. Thus, we found partial
support for Hypothesis 1b.
Table 2 also presents the results regarding Hypothesis 2 on fulfillment-based
exchange. Hypothesis 2a related temporary employment to mutual high obligation
psychological contract fulfilment, which was supported in our results. Hypothesis
2b related permanent employment to quasi-spot and employer under-obligation
psychological contract fulfilment. This hypothesis was found to be partially sup-
ported. Permanent workers were more likely to perceive fulfilled quasi-spot
contract than were temporary workers (b = 0.45, p < 0.05). However, no such
significant associations were found for employer under-obligation.
Our third hypothesis concerned the relationship between the promise-based
psychological contract types and employees’ attitudes. The results in Table 3
(panel a) show that the promise-based psychological contract types were not sig-
nificantly related to job satisfaction or intention to quit. Promise-based psychologi-
cal contracts were weakly related to fairness (F = 4.11, p < 0.01). Table 3 (panel a)
also presents the results of the post-hoc Bonferroni tests. The last column shows
the statistically significant differences between promised psychological contract
types, if present. Respondents in the high mutual obligation psychological contract
do not report higher levels of job satisfaction nor lower levels of intention to quit
compared with respondents in the other promise-based psychological contracts.
The mutual high obligation and quasi-spot types differed with respect to fairness;
respondents in the mutual high obligation category reported higher levels of
fairness than those in the quasi-spot category. Overall, only weak evidence was
found for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 concerned the relationship between fulfillment-based psycho-
logical contract types and employees’ attitudes. The types of fulfillment-based
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psychological contracts were significantly associated with all outcomes (Table 3,
panel b). In particular, respondents with a fulfilled mutual high obligation psy-
chological contract reported higher levels of fairness and job satisfaction and are
less inclined to quit the organization compared to respondents with quasi-spot
or employer under-obligation psychological contract fulfilment. Furthermore,
respondents with employer over-obligation psychological contract fulfilment
Table 3. Employee attitudes under four psychological contract types†










1 2 3 4
Fairness
Mean 3.40 3.51 3.67 3.69 4.11** 4 > 1
SD (0.72) (0.82) (0.83) (0.71)
Job satisfaction
Mean 4.18 4.23 4.25 4.36 1.37
SD (0.75) (0.67) (0.93) (0.64)
Intention to quit
Mean 1.77 1.71 1.44 1.60 1.95
SD (0.74) (0.74) (0.49) (0.66)










1 2 3 4
Fairness
Mean 3.30 3.35 3.73 4.05 43.20*** 4 > 1,2; 3 > 1,2
SD (0.68) (0.74) (0.66) (0.69)
Job satisfaction
Mean 4.04 4.23 4.36 4.59 23.69*** 4 > 1,2
SD (0.69) (0.69) (0.68) (0.60)
Intention to quit
Mean 1.89 1.70 1.61 1.43 14.77*** 4 > 1,2; 2 > 1
SD (0.79) (0.68) (0.78) (0.53)
Notes:
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
† Age, gender, and educational level were entered as covariates.
Balance in Psychological Contracts 343
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
reported higher levels of fairness in comparison to respondents who perceived
fulfilment in quasi-spot and employer under-obligation psychological contracts.
Respondents who perceived employer under-obligation psychological contract
fulfilment are less inclined to quit the organization than respondents with a
fulfilled quasi-spot psychological contract. No significant differences were
found between respondents who perceived fulfilment in mutual high obligation
and employer over-obligation psychological contracts. This largely supported
Hypothesis 4.
DISCUSSION
The present study’s aims were twofold. First, we investigated the differences
between temporary and permanent workers’ perceptions concerning reciprocal
exchange. Second, we assessed the relationship between these perceptions and a
number of employees’ attitudes (fairness, job satisfaction, and intention to quit).
To address these aims, we elaborated on past research in the realm of psycho-
logical contract balance and exchange. This study expands upon previous
research (e.g., Shore & Barksdale, 1998; Tsui et al., 1997) by not only examining
the effects of promise-based exchange, but also including fulfillment-based
exchange. Assessing the effects of both exchanges allows for the evaluation of
different types of exchanges, such as quasi-spot contracts and mutual high obli-
gation psychological contracts, from a perspective of promises as well as of ful-
filled promises.
The findings from this study have implications for psychological contract
research. First, the results highlighted the importance of exchange in terms of
perceived balance, as previously demonstrated by Tsui et al. (1997), Koh and Yer
(2000), Shore and Barksdale (1998), and De Cuyper et al. (2008b). Whereas earlier
studies focused on promise-based exchange, the present study goes one step further
in underlining the importance of fulfillment-based exchange. In this respect,
fulfillment-based exchange related more strongly to employee attitudes than
promise-based exchange. It appears that employee–employer exchanges in terms
of perceived promise fulfilment are of particular importance and are probably
more important than promise-based exchange if the aim is to understand employee
attitudes.
Second, our findings indicated differences between temporary and permanent
workers regarding the type of promise-based exchange as well as fulfillment-based
exchange. Exchange in temporary workers can be characterized in general as
narrower (i.e., fewer promises) but more easily fulfilled. Conversely, exchange in
permanent workers is broader (i.e., more promises) but more difficult to fulfil.
Previous research on psychological contracts in temporary employment found the
same dynamics but mostly focused on the promises of the organization (Chambel
& Castanheira, 2006; Guest & Clinton, 2005). Our findings show that these
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dynamics also apply to employee promises, creating reciprocity in employment
exchanges which feature mutually narrow contracts that are more easily fulfilled
and mutually broad contracts that are more difficult to fulfil.
These findings have important implications for research in the realm of tempo-
rary employment too. First, we established that temporary workers report a fairly
narrow exchange of promises. One explanation could be that some temporary
workers seek out a psychological contract with few but specific promises; for
example, temporary workers may prefer a relationship with few responsibilities or
with little commitment. Alternatively, they may want to combine work with
responsibilities at home, or they may enjoy the variety of working in many different
employment settings (see Tan & Tan, 2002).
Second, we observed that temporary workers perceive fairly good exchange
where fulfilment is concerned compared with permanent workers. Temporary
workers report that both parties commit to their promises. This is not the case
for permanent workers, who see fewer promises fulfilled. This corresponds with
our expectations: we argued that permanent workers’ psychological contracts are
more susceptible to breach, owing to the fairly intangible and vague content of
psychological contract promises (McLean-Parks et al., 1998). Conversely, tempo-
rary workers’ psychological contracts are less likely to be breached as they are
based on specific agreements, implying that fulfilment is more observable. More-
over, temporary workers may anticipate the fulfilment of employer promises in
the future.
Third, we did not find significant associations between permanent employment
and employer under-obligation psychological contracts in the case of fulfillment-
based exchange. We hypothesized that permanent workers would be more likely to
overestimate their contributions in comparison to temporary workers. Temporary
workers, however, may stress the fulfilment of their promises to improve their
chances of permanent employment. By focusing on their own achievements rather
than on the investments of the organization, temporary workers may want to
promote their nomination for a permanent job, which can be one of the primary
motivators of temporary workers (Tan & Tan, 2002).
Fourth, the finding that mutual high fulfilment of promises compared with
quasi-spot fulfilment is associated with overall favourable attitudes may explain
earlier findings concerning the relationship between temporary employment and
employees’ attitudes. Review studies report that results are inconclusive, while a
significant number of studies have actually shown favourable results for temporary
workers compared to permanent workers (Connelly & Gallagher, 2004; De Cuyper
et al., 2008a). This has spurred researchers’ interest in the mechanisms and
processes underlying the fairly favourable responses of temporary workers. One
such process could be exchange fulfilment as temporary workers have narrower
promise-based psychological contracts that are more easily fulfilled, leading to
more favourable employee attitudes.
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Limitations and Implications for Future Research
A number of issues may limit the implications of our research and require addi-
tional research. First, our findings were based on cross-sectional and self-reported
data that clearly present some threat with respect to causal inferences and common
method variance. However, a single-method-factor analysis as proposed by Pod-
sakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) as well as the CFAs reported earlier
revealed no problems of common method variance with respect to the independent
and dependent variables. Second, the non-representativeness of our data may limit
the external validity of our findings. A third limitation concerns our measure of the
psychological contract types. Our measure did not address excess obligations,
preferences for certain promises, and reasons for few promises. These omissions
may provide a rather limited view of the psychological contract types (Lambert
et al., 2003), even though they align with measures used in earlier studies (e.g., De
Cuyper et al., 2008b). Nevertheless, they should be addressed in future research.
Fourth, we used a median-split procedure to obtain the four types of psychological
contracts. The variable-splitting procedure has been criticized for loss of power,
increasing Type I error, and bias when dichotomizing dependent and independent
variables (e.g., Irwin & McClelland, 2003). Although we followed the same proce-
dure as Tsui et al. (1997) and Koh and Yer (2000), the limitations of the median-
split approach should be considered when interpreting our results. Fifth, few
respondents reported having an employer over-obligation psychological contract,
be it based on promise-based exchange or fulfillment-based exchange. This
resembles other studies using the same framework (De Cuyper et al., 2008b; Shore
& Barksdale, 1998; Tsui et al., 1997) and can be explained by the tendency to be
critical towards the promises and fulfilment by the employer while overestimating
one’s own contributions. However, the low number of respondents in the employer
over-obligation category limited our possibilities of comparing this type of psycho-
logical contract to the other psychological contract types.
Moreover, this study made fairly general statements with respect to temporary
workers. However, research has shown that the temporary workforce is quite
diverse (De Cuyper et al., 2008a). Whether this heterogeneity of the temporary
workforce has implications for the results of this study requires further exploration.
One type of temporary employment that is of particular relevance is temporary
agency work: temporary agency workers are involved in a triangular employment
relationship (Liden, Wayne, Kraimer, & Sparrowe, 2003). This dual commitment
possibly affects the content of the psychological contract (Claes, 2005). Another
aspect of temporary workforce heterogeneity that could be relevant concerns
expectations of future employment. These expectations have been found to have
an immediate impact on temporary employee attitudes and behaviour, and
they may influence how temporary workers evaluate the psychological contract
(Goudswaard, Kraan, & Dhondt, 2000).
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Furthermore, this study was applied in a specific context of labour relations and
institutional conditions, which limits the external validity of this study. In the
Netherlands, there is an extensive framework of labour laws and regulations
specifically developed to protect employees, both temporary and permanent. For
example, Dutch temporary employees can rely on a safety net including mutually
agreed minimum wages and minimum demands with respect to safe working
environments (Heerma van Voss, 1999). Having these safeguards can positively
affect their acceptance of employment relationships with low employer obligations
since they are assured of a minimum payback for their efforts. A worthwhile
avenue to pursue in future research would be to study exchange and balance in
contexts with fewer safeguards, such as the USA.
Last but not least, results from a Dutch sample may not generalize across borders,
especially to countries like China, which differs from the Netherlands on a number
of cultural values. Farh, Hackett, and Liang (2007), for example, showed that results
of social exchange studies on employee attitudes in the United States did not
replicate well in a sample of Chinese workers. They suggest that ‘social exchange–
based explanations for worker attitudes and performance may apply less well to
Chinese employees in the PRC than they do to American workers in the United
States’ (2007: 724). The Farh et al. (2007) study shows that, in the Chinese context,
differences in power distance and traditionality influence the relationship between
perceived organizational support on the one hand and work outcomes on the other
hand. These results suggest that it is important to take cultural context factors into
account when considering the implications of the results of our study for China.
CONCLUSION
The current study has some non-intuitive findings, especially in terms of balance in
psychological contract fulfilment. Permanent workers are more likely to report
quasi-spot contract fulfilment, while temporary workers are more likely to report
mutual high obligation psychological contract fulfilment. Further, it is fulfilment-
based psychological contracts rather than promise-based psychological contracts
that relate to employee attitudes. These results do not necessarily imply that it is
best to have a mutually narrow psychological contract that is more easily fulfilled
by both parties. Rather, our findings imply that the content of the psychological
contract should be communicated clearly by both employer and employee. By
creating and maintaining a common understanding about the mutual intentions to
invest in the employment relationship, obligations are more likely to be fulfilled.
We encourage further attention to the dynamics between psychological contract
promises and fulfilment. An important route for future research concerns the
performance implications of psychological contract promises and fulfilment as well
as investigation of these ideas in other cultural contexts, including China, to search
for a universal theory of psychological contracts.
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